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Introduction
This chapter focuses on an important measurement issue: what is the 
Federal Government’s exposure to catastrophes? In addressing this issue, 
the authors deﬁ  ne “exposure” in two ways, both of which are commonly 
used by risk managers. One measure of exposure is the expected annual 
cost. The other measure of exposure captures the cost that might be experi-
enced in a particularly bad year. More precisely, the second measure is the 
cost level that will be exceeded with a low probability—say, 1 percent—or 
equivalently, it is the ninety-  ninth percentile value of the cost distribution. 
Given a probability distribution for annual catastrophe costs, calculating 
the expected annual cost and a speciﬁ  c percentile value is straightforward. 
The diﬃcult task is estimating the probability distribution for annual catas-
trophe costs.
Before discussing the empirical methods used in the chapter, it is appro-
priate to step back and identify why it is important to measure the Federal 
Government’s exposure to catastrophes. Certainly from a budgeting and 
planning perspective, it is important to estimate both the expected costs 
and the magnitude of the potential costs. In addition, measuring exposure 
is the ﬁ  rst step in analyzing a number of important economic and public 
policy issues related to the impact of government disaster assistance, includ-
ing the impact of this assistance on (a) the incentives to purchase private 
insurance, (b) the distribution of wealth, and (c) real estate development 
in catastrophe-  prone areas. Thus, this chapter provides an important, 
initial step in a more comprehensive analysis of public policy related to 
catastrophes.
In the next section, I summarize and comment on the methodology and 
the main results of the chapter. In the ﬁ  nal section, I brieﬂ  y discuss some of 
the implications and possible extensions of the analysis.
The Probability Distribution for Catastrophe-  Related Costs?
The Federal Government incurs costs related to natural and man-  made 
catastrophes, and the authors consider costs from both of these catego-
ries. The chapter does a nice job of identifying the many diﬀerent pro-
grams that are exposed to catastrophes, including the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) disaster relief programs, subsidized loans 
to households and businesses aﬀected by catastrophes, aid to farmers 
through the US Department of Agriculture, the National Flood Insurance 
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Program (NFIP), the Terrorist Risk Insurance Program (TRIP), and damage 
to government property. However, the focus of the chapter is on the largest 
exposure—disaster assistance. As a result, the estimates understate the 
actual exposure of the Federal Government.
The procedure for estimating the probability distribution for disaster 
assistance has three steps. First, the ratio of disaster assistance to catas-
trophe losses is estimated using historical data from 1989 to 2006: (disaster 
assistance) /   (catastrophe losses). Second, the probability distribution for 
annual catastrophe losses is estimated: catastrophe loss distribution. Third, 
the ratio found in step one is combined with the probability distribution 
from step two to estimate the probability distribution for annual disaster 
assistance. Given this distribution, the authors calculate expected annual 
disaster assistance and various percentile values of the disaster assistance 
distribution.
Step One: Ratio of Disaster Assistance to Catastrophe Losses
The authors use a variety of approaches to estimate the ratio of disas-
ter assistance to catastrophe losses. For the numerator, they either use 
emergency supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance and thus 
exclude all budgeted disaster costs, or they use total disaster spending. For 
the denominator, they use total damage estimates for catastrophe events 
that caused more than $1 billion in total damages. Most of the catastro-
phe events are weather related, but the data also include earthquakes and 
terrorist attacks.
The ratio of disaster assistance to catastrophe losses is calculated using 
nominal losses and losses that have been adjusted to 2006 prices. In addi-
tion, the ratio is calculated in aggregate, by event, and by year. These vari-
ous approaches yield a ratio of disaster assistance to catastrophe losses that 
ranges from about 32 percent to 50 percent (see table 4.1).
An interesting result presented in table 4.1 is the ratio of disaster assis-
tance to uninsured losses. The estimates for this ratio range from about 57 
percent to 95 percent. Using the maximum value, this implies that 95 per-
cent of losses that are not covered by private insurance are insured for free 
through disaster assistance. The upper part of this range certainly indicates 
a coverage ratio that exceeds the coverage ratio commonly available in the 
private market, in large part because private insurers understand the moral 
hazard associated with high coverage ratios. Disaster assistance at this level 
is likely to have an important moral hazard eﬀect on where people decide to 
locate and the amount of private insurance that they purchase.
Step Two: The Catastrophe Loss Distribution
The authors use two approaches for estimating the probability distribution 
for catastrophe losses. One approach is essentially a black box approach—
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phe modeling ﬁ  rm, Applied Insurance Research (AIR). Catastrophe models 
simulate the impact of natural disasters on property damage in speciﬁ  ed 
geographical areas. These models incorporate information about the char-
acteristics of property in terms of its use and construction and are widely 
used by insurers to assess their property damage exposure. The AIR model 
indicates that expected total catastrophe losses are in the range of 35 to 43 
billion dollars and that the ninety-  ninth percentile value is in the range of 
273 to 282 billion dollars.
The second approach uses Property Claims Services (PCS) historical data 
on insured losses from catastrophes. Importantly, these data are adjusted to 
account for price changes and economic development that have occurred 
over time. This adjustment, which allows one to estimate the losses that 
would have occurred today from storms that occurred in the past, leads to 
several interesting observations:
•    Hurricane Katrina in 2005 has the largest nominal loss of $44 billion.
•   Adjusted losses from a 1950 wind and thunderstorm event that hit from 
Maryland to Maine equal $227 billion.
•   Adjusted losses from Hurricanes Carol and Hazel in 1954 equal 
$257 billion.
Using the adjusted catastrophe loss data, the authors estimate the annual 
frequency and severity distribution for catastrophe losses and then com-
pound these distributions to estimate the total loss distribution. The PCS 
data indicate that expected losses are in the range of 39 to 48 billion dol-
lars and that the ninety-  ninth percentile value is in the range of 272 to 337 
billion dollars.
It is important to note that both approaches consider only natural catas-
trophes (and thus omit man- made catastrophes such as terrorist attacks) and 
thus understate the actual catastrophe exposure. Also, it is notable that the 
two approaches lead to similar overall exposure estimates.
Step Three: Federal Government’s Exposure to Disaster Assistance
Multiplying the ratio of disaster assistance to catastrophe losses (step one) 
and the expected annual catastrophe losses (step two) yields an estimate of 
annual expected disaster assistance between 10 and 25 billion dollars and an 
estimate for the ninety-  ninth percentile value of annual disaster assistance 
between 80 and 170 billion dollars.
Discussion
According to the authors, the Federal Government currently sets aside 
about $2 billion for disaster assistance. If one takes the midpoint of the 
annual expected disaster assistance ($17.5 billion) and subtracts the amount 
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assistance—about $15.5 billion annually. Assuming that this liability grows 
at approximately the same rate as the discount rate over the next thirty-  ﬁ  ve 
years, the present value of the liability is over $500 billion. The conclusion 
is clear: taxpayers bear a signiﬁ  cant liability for disaster assistance.
The magnitude of disaster assistance certainly leads one to suspect that 
there are potentially important moral hazard eﬀects with respect to private 
insurance coverage and real estate development. Further research on these 
eﬀects is important for the optimal design of federal disaster assistance pol-
icy. Another area of research would be on the distributional eﬀects of disas-
ter assistance. For example, it would be interesting to document the amount 
of disaster assistance received by people grouped according to income and 
wealth levels. There also are interesting political economy questions associ-
ated with disaster assistance: for example, is the cross-  sectional variation in 
the ratio of disaster assistance to catastrophe loss related to the seniority 
and/  or committee assignments of legislators?
As the authors point out, knowing the magnitude of liability is neces-
sary information for policymakers to develop optimal disaster relief policy. 
The authors go one step further and suggest that the expected annual cost 
(between 10 and 25 billion dollars) should be part of the regular budget-
ing process. Note, however, that there is considerable variability associated 
with actual costs around the expected value; most years will have far lower 
costs and a few years will have far higher costs. The politics of government 
spending raise a concern that budgeting the expected annual cost will lead 
policy oﬃcials to spend the amount budgeted, even in years with relatively 
low actual catastrophe losses. Under the current regime, politicians must 
justify assistance beyond the low amount currently budgeted (about $2 bil-
lion) to fellow legislators. Granted, this may not be a signiﬁ  cant hurdle, but 
budgeting more money without restricting special appropriations is likely 
to lead to even higher costs.
In summary, this chapter analyzes an important issue. The analysis is 
rigorous and carefully executed. Although the estimates of exposure depend 
on numerous assumptions, the authors justify these assumptions and in each 
case choose an approach that is likely to lead to a conservative estimate of 
the Federal Government’s exposure to catastrophes. Moreover, the estimates 
are consistent across the diﬀerent methods that are used, which lends greater 
credibility to the estimates. There are a number of interesting results. The 
main conclusion is that the Federal Government has a signiﬁ  cant exposure 
to catastrophes through its disaster assistance programs. Now, we need addi-
tional research on the implications of the eﬀects of this disaster assistance 
and on the optimal design of public policy for catastrophes.